Montez(2013)在他的文章中，面对有限数量的购买者，耐用品垄断导致了低效的销售延迟，他对耐用品的缓慢使用和计划外的降价给出了不同的解释。针对一定数量的购买者，研究了耐用品垄断的标准模型(Montez, 2013)。通过证明这个特殊的博弈可以有许多子博弈的完全均衡除了吃豆人的结果包括科斯猜想。再往前，参考Muller(2014)的研究论文，关于双边市场或平台产业中营销集中度的影响的文献往往是按照一个基准比较垄断竞争结果。这个特定的基准要么是联合管理的解决方案，其中一个决策者将运行每个和每个平台，要么是一个单一平台的纯粹垄断(Mueller & Boehme, 2011)。最后，考虑到期刊上关于异构用户三部分关税的文章:垄断和双寡头案例，虽然两部分关税已经得到了广泛的研究，但是考虑三部分关税要素的论文却很少。
此外，这些论文中没有任何一篇成功地解决了一些基本和基本的问题，这些问题涉及存在异构用户时关税的最优属性(Baek & Brueckner, 2015)。均衡的一类具有特定的利益，在均衡中，卖方首先被收取更高的价格，只有当一些高估值的买家进行购买时，这个价格才会降低(Montez, 2013)。这种价格结构似乎造成了买方之间的磨擦冲突，导致市场清仓的延迟和价格削减和购买的非预定日期的合理化。当政府变革的定义仅限于政府范围内的实质性变革时，这种影响具有很强的意义(Montez, 2013)。这篇文献综述不仅讨论了哪一种特定的基准可以被认为适合垄断。在这篇论文中，作者假设平台的最优数量高度依赖于单户或多户、是否存在正的网络外部性或负的网络外部性。该研究通过建立这些成果，而不是将它们保存在实质性和方法论正统的琥珀下，表明了它对过去经济学家取得的成就的尊重(Mueller & Boehme, 2011)。
In his article Inefﬁcient sales delays by a durable-goods monopoly facing a ﬁnite number of buyers, Montez (2013) has offered a different explanation regarding slow adoption of durable goods and unscheduled cutting of price. A standard model of durable goods monopoly has been studied with a certain number of buyers (Montez, 2013). This has been done by showing that this particular game can have a number of subgame perfect equilibria apart from the outcome of Pacman that include the conjecture of Coase.Further ahead, referring to the research paper of Muller (2014), the literature on the impacts of concentration of marketing in two sided market or platform industries tend to be comparing the monopolistic competitive result in accordance with a benchmark. This particular benchmark is either the solution of joint management within which a single decision maker will be running each and every platform or a pure monopoly with a single platform (Mueller & Boehme, 2011).Finally, considering the journal article of Three-Part Tariffs with Heterogeneous Users: Monopoly and Duopoly Cases, even though two part tariffs have been studied widely, there are only few paper considering the elements of three part tariffs.
In addition, not any of these papers have been successful in addressing some fundamental and elementary questions in concern with the optimal attributes of the tariff with the existence of heterogeneous users (Baek & Brueckner, 2015).There is specific interest in the class of equilibria in which the seller is first charged with higher price and this price is lowered only when some buyers of high valuation make the purchases (Montez, 2013). This structure of price seems to be creating a conflict of attrition among the buyers, which result in delay of market clearance and rationalization of unscheduled dates of price cut and purchase. This impact has strong significance when the definition of government change is restricted to cases regarding substantial changes across the government (Montez, 2013). This review of literature has not just presented a discussion which particular benchmark can be considered appropriate for monopoly. Within the paper, the authors has hypothesised that optimal number of platforms are highly dependent on whether singlehome or multihome, whether there are positive network externalities or negative network externalities. The research has demonstrated its respect for achieving from past economists by establishment of these achievements, not to preserve them under the amber of substantive and methodological orthodoxy (Mueller & Boehme, 2011).