加拿大夏洛特顿论文代写：契约理论
加拿大夏洛特顿论文代写：契约理论
当它是由管理人员决定，他们不得不卖掉他们的如此大量的股票就成为提高其股票价格的短期激励，他们也许能说明他们的注意力放在股票价格在短期内增加无视这一事实，这可能是在企业的长期价值为代价。相关的所有初始有限展开可能成为公司不提倡不涉及性能在相同的角度以不同的限制完全成本（Graham等人2005）。
从这个角度来看，很明显，一个小的角色所扮演的会计信息，以决定是否有错误。一个主要组成部分是由会计信息，不仅为管理人员的报酬，但也为贷款合同。在条款的书面原因是报酬管理合同需要与管理者的绩效与股东的利益联系在一起的因素。奖金的捆绑可以通过财务措施的实体表现来完成.。因此，两个重要的角色扮演的会计信息，这是在合同管理条款的作用，并确定合同条款的性能导致随之而来的奖金金额和几个组成部分的报酬收到经理。
已经很明显，是一个重要的角色，发挥会计信息的管理，如在确定绩效工资的反对随之而来的奖金数额和几个组件的管理人员将接受合同条款的作用提供了一个合同条款的书面文件（Graham et al，2005）。然而，风险规避背后的主要问题是，即使会计信息的使用过程中的承包，仍然存在信息不对称。这种不对称是关于支付绩效的措施不足。然而，会计信息应该是这样的，它提供了完整的足够的信息，以摆脱非对称信息。随着会计随着为人的未来预期完全披露形式和市场公告来看，有利于竞争对手的基本事实披露的帮助。
加拿大夏洛特顿论文代写：契约理论
When it is decided by the executives that they have to sell their stock of such a large number then they become motivated for increasing their stock price short run and they may illustrate their attention towards stock price in short term increasing disregard the fact that this may be at the long term value expense of the corporate. Costs associated for all with initial limited unwinding may then become limited without advocation of pay without involving performance within the same perspective in order to separate the restriction thoroughly (Graham et al 2005).
From this perspective, it becomes evident that a small role is played by information of accounting in order to decide the errors if any. A major component is formed by accounting information not only for the remuneration of managers but also for the contracts to lend. The reason behind terms being written is the factor that contracts of remunerating management need to be linked with the performance of managers to the interests of shareholders. The tie up of bonus can be done with the entity performance of finances measures. Therefore, two important roles are played by accounting information which is the role in contracts of management terms and for determining the contracts terms against the performance leading towards consequent bonus amount and several components of pay received by managers.
As already evident, an important role is played by accounting information such as by providing a written document of the contractual terms in a management and the role of determining the contractual terms in opposition to the performance for consequent bonus amount and several components of pay that the managers will be receiving (Graham et al 2005). However, the main issue behind risk aversion is the fact that even though information of accounting is used within the process of contracting, still there exists asymmetry in information. This asymmetry is with regard to insufficient measure of pay performance. However, information of accounting should be such that it provides complete adequate information to get rid of the asymmetrical information. With the help of disclosure of accounting along with complete disclosure forms and market announcements for signally future expectations in order to view the essential facts that have to be advantageous to the competitors.
